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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Meyer Proctor, a seventy-year-old man, filed a product liability 
lawsuit against The Upjohn Company after he lost vision in his left eye.  
The jury awarded Mr. Proctor $127 million.1  Such were the facts as 
relayed by Senator John Danforth to members of the United States Senate 
during a 1994 speech in favor of a tort reform bill.2  However, this 
recitation was not an accurate portrayal of Proctor v. Davis and for his 
part Senator Danforth never intended his story to be completely correct.3  
Rather, it is very likely that Senator Danforth purposely made his 
rendition of Proctor v. Davis sound outrageous in an attempt to portray 
an out of control tort system, which made it difficult for businesses to 
operate under an onslaught of frivolous lawsuits and exorbitant jury 
verdicts.4  Anecdotal evidence, similar to the one offered by Senator 
Danforth, was meant to encourage tort reform. 
Tort law, like many other areas of the law, is concerned with the 
proper allocation of costs.  Torts are civil wrongs, from the Latin “tortus” 
which means “twisted.”5  In modern times a tort is an injury or wrongful 
 
 1  CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED DEMOCRACY, 
BIG BUSINESS, AND THE COMMON LAW 1 (2001).  
 2  BOGUS, supra note 1, at 6. 
 3  Proctor v. Davis, 656 N.E. 2d 23, 23 (App. Ct. Ill. 1997) (The case itself actually 
settled for just over $6 million.  In reality the suit was a joint medical malpractice suit and 
product liability suited filed because Mr. Proctor’s retina had become detached after receiving 
an injection Depo-Medrol, a drug not tested for intraocular injection). 
 4  See id. (reversing trial court judgment against Upjohn); also see 677 N.E. 2d 918, 918 
(Ill. 1997) (vacating the prior decision on procedural grounds; and 682 N.E. 2dd 1203) (App. 
Ct. Ill. 1995) (affirming judgment against Upjohn as to compensatory damages and reducing 
punitive damages award). 
 5  Edward Coke, Commentary on Littleton, SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD 
COKE, VOL. I (1586) (“Torts” are so called because they are wrested or crooked, as opposed 
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act for which an action will lie, distinct from a contract.6  Fittingly, tort 
law includes personal injury adjudication.  It is fair then, to refine the 
prior statement to say that tort law is concerned with the proper allocation 
of costs in disputes between injured parties and those who have caused 
the injury. 
The costs of the tort system are high to both the injured parties who 
lose income, quality of life, and often life itself; and to the parties 
responsible for the injuries who must pay damages if found liable.  Tort 
reformers, however, ignore the costs to the injured parties, in order to 
decry the costs to the injuring (often corporate) parties.  The American 
Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”) stated that in 2003, the cost of the 
United States tort system was $246 billion.7  That amount represented a 
34.5% increase in cost from 2000.8  By 2009, the amount had further 
increased to $251.8 billion.9 
This Article examines several arguments in favor of tort reform 
using economic analysis.  By using economic analysis, this Article 
dispenses with the weak anecdotal evidence and disingenuous political 
rhetoric to objectively address the strengths and weaknesses of the tort 
system.  It follows that an objective analysis, not political rhetoric, ought 
to determine whether there is truly a need to reform the tort system. 
Part II examines the goals of tort law from an economic perspective.  
Part II analyzes the work of Judge Guido Calabresi who distilled the aims 
of tort law down into three articulable goals.  Additionally, Part II 
analyzes a framework created by the author for objectively examining the 
effects of tort reform.  Part III begins with a brief history of the tort reform 
movement.  Furthermore, Part III discusses several of the major 
arguments employed in support of tort reform.  Finally, this Article 
address several methods of tort reform that are often suggested or 
implemented by various states. 
Part IV addresses several arguments against tort reform.  Part IV 
examines a theory that tort law, being based on common law, is inherently 
more efficient than either state or federal legislative efforts to allocate 
injury costs.  Finally, Part IV employs the framework developed in Part 
II to analyze the arguments for and against tort reform. 
 
to that which is right and straight). 
 6  Sir William Blackstone, 3 COMMENTARIES 177 (1775).  
 7  American Tort Reform Association, Facts About Tort Liability and its Impact on 
Consumers, http://web.archive.org/web/20100731070852/http://www.atra.org/wrap/files.cgi 
7963_howtortreform.html (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 8  Id. 
 9  Towers Watson, U.S. Tort Cost Trends 2011 Update, http://www.casact.org/library/st 
dynotes/Towers-Watson-Tort-Cost-Trends.pdf (last visited May 10, 2018).  
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II. THE GOALS OF TORT LAW 
A. Why Have Tort Law in the First Place? 
Tort law creates rules for how courts must apportion liability for 
accidents.  Tort reformers often decry these rules as being unfair to 
defendants, and advocate for change.  Negligence is the most common 
tort claim, and therefore, this Article will focus mainly on negligence 
rules and tort reform.  In examining whether tort reform is necessary, a 
good starting point is whether there should be a rule of negligence at all.  
To answer this question, it is first necessary to picture a world in which 
the loss associated with an injury falls solely upon the injured party. 
Assume that an individual (“Pedestrian”) intends to cross a street at 
a cross walk where another party (“Driver”) is making a right-hand turn.  
For both parties the cost of exercising no care at all is $0 while the cost 
of exercising due care is $10.  Further, assume that an accident is certain 
to happen unless both parties exercise due care.  The cost of an accident 
is $100 and there is a one in ten chance that Pedestrian will be injured by 
Driver’s actions even if due care is exercised by both parties.  If neither 
party exercises due care, Driver receives a payoff of $0 and Pedestrian 
receives a payoff of -$100.  If Driver exercises due care and Pedestrian 
exercises no care, Driver receives a payoff of -$10 (the cost of exercising 
due care) and Pedestrian receives a payoff of -$100.  If Driver exercises 
no care and Pedestrian exercises due care, Driver receives a payoff of $0, 
while Pedestrian receives a payoff of -$110 (accident cost plus the cost 
of exercising due care).  Finally, if both parties exercise due care, Driver 
receives a payoff of -$10 and Pedestrian receives a payoff of -$20 (the 
cost of due care plus the cost of a one in ten chance of an accident 
occurring). 
 
Game One Payoffs: Pedestrian, Driver 
  Driver 
  No Care Due Care 
Pedestrian 
No Care -100, 0 -100, -10 
Due Care -110, 0 -20, -10 
 
In Game One, Driver employs a dominant strategy where the Driver 
never exercises care.  By never choosing to exercise care, Driver is able 
to reduce his costs to $0.  Pedestrian, however, has no dominant strategy.  
Pedestrian’s best outcome requires Driver to exercise due care which, as 
we have seen, is not in Drivers best interest.  As a matter of cost savings, 
it can be assumed that Pedestrian will choose to exercise no care as well. 
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B. The Goals of Tort Law 
The second question that should be raised is: if there is a rule of 
negligence, what should be its goal?  Judge Calabresi stated that the goals 
of accident law are two-fold: first, the goal of accident law is justice; and 
second, the goal of accident law is to reduce the costs of accidents.10  With 
regard to the first goal, it is important to note that justice is, by nature, an 
abstract concept.  Although what is just to one person may seem unjust 
to another, justice must be considered a factor in determining what rules 
can and should be adopted.  Reducing the costs of accidents, however, is 
a much more concrete goal which may be discussed with less ambiguity. 
Judge Calabresi has divided accident cost reduction into three sub-
goals: (1) reducing the number and severity of accidents, (2) reducing 
societal costs from accidents, and (3) reducing the costs of administering 
accidents.11  These sub-goals focus on three dimensions of social welfare- 
the allocative, the distributive, and the administrative.12  Each sub-goal 
should be addressed in turn. 
i. Reducing the Number and Severity of Accidents 
Perhaps the most obvious sub-goal of tort law is to reduce the 
number and severity of accidents.  This is torts in its classic role as a 
deterrent, influencing our behavior by raising the price we pay for 
negligent acts.  This role is the allocative dimension of tort law. 
Although Judge Calabresi argued that the fault system of liability is 
“absurd”13 and “irrational,”14 Judge Calabresi failed to offer a superior 
system.  Furthermore, an empirical study has shown that the fault system 
has had a deterrent effect.15  Accidents, auto accidents in particular,16 
have been reduced in part due to the effect of the fault system on 
insurance premiums.17 
 
 10  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS-A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24 
(1970). 
 11  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 26-28.  
 12  Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi’s “The Cost of Accidents”: A Reassessment, 64 MD. 
L. REV. 12, 15 (2005). 
 13  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 276, 285. 
14 CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 276, 285. 
 15  Posner, supra note 12, at 18-19. 
 16  Posner, supra note 12, at 19.  See also Christopher J. Bruce, The Deterrent Effects of 
Automobile Insurance and Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 6 J.L. & POL’Y67 
(1984); J. David Cummins et al., The Incentive Effects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 44 
J.L. & ECON. 427 (2001); Richard W. Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability 
Insurance-The Empirical Evidence, 40 INS COUNS J. 117 (1973); Elisabeth M. Landes, 
Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation of the Effect 
of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1982). 
 17  Posner, supra note 12, at 19. 
TRACZ 2018 
316 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
Judge Calabresi has further broken down the deterrent effect into 
two types of deterrence: general and specific.18  General deterrence 
involves attempting to discern the accident costs of activities and based 
on these costs “letting the market determine the degree to 
which. . .[those] activities are desired.”19  By contrast, general deterrence 
treats accident costs much the same as the costs of any other goods or 
activities.20  If all activities accurately represent their accident costs, 
individuals can determine whether an activity is worth engaging in based 
on the cost.21 
General deterrence works in two ways.  First, it creates incentives to 
engage in safer activities, so long as accident costs are accurately 
reflected in prices.22  Second, general deterrence encourages making 
activities safer.23  Often, this is achieved by encouraging a small amount 
of spending for general safety improvements in order to avoid higher 
accident costs in the future.24 
The second type of deterrence discussed by Judge Calabresi is 
specific deterrence.  Contrary to general deterrence, which is 
individualistic and market based, specific deterrence is collective and 
involves decisions made through a political process.25  In specific 
deterrence, all of the benefits and all of the costs (including accident 
costs) of an activity would be taken together.  Collectively, decisions 
would be made as to the manner in which each activity should be 
performed and the amount of each activity that should be allowed.26  
Judge Calabresi acknowledges that specific deterrence is not really a 
feasible or even a preferable means of deterrence.27 
ii. Reducing Societal Costs from Accidents 
Reducing societal costs from accidents is the second sub-goal of 
accident law. Judge Calabresi repeatedly refers to these societal costs as 
“secondary costs.”28  This is the distributive role of tort law, which seeks 
to answer the question: once the costs have been properly allocated, how 
should the costs be distributed. 
 
 18  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 68-69. 
 19  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 69. 
 20  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 69. 
 21  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 69. 
 22  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 73. 
 23  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 73. 
 24  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 73-74. 
 25  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 95. 
 26  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 95. 
 27  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 95. 
 28  Posner, supra note 12, at 15. 
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Compensating the injured party is a fundament feature of accident 
law, and to that end accident loss distribution deserves some discussion.29  
Judge Calabresi mentions several principal systems through which 
accident loss distribution can occur in our society: social insurance, 
private risk pooling (insurance), and enterprise liability.30  The merits of 
each should be considered individually. 
Social insurance is the easiest means to achieve a system of loss 
spreading.31  In its most basic form social insurance would involve paying 
taxes into a large pot from which injury victims would be compensated, 
therefore spreading the loss amongst all taxpayers rather than solely on 
the party(s) responsible for the injury.32  Realistically, social insurance 
could be more complicated as we determine whom to tax, at what rate to 
tax, and whether there is an income redistribution agenda that we are 
seeking to enforce.33  For these reasons social insurance appears 
unattractive and would likely be difficult to sell politically. 
Private risk pooling, or, more simply put, insurance, is the most 
common system of accident loss distribution.34  Insurance consists of 
individuals privately or voluntarily pooling money to protect against risk.  
According to Judge Calabresi, there are two types of risk that insurance 
protects against: the risk of having above average accident costs, and the 
risk of having to incur costs sooner than average.35  In private risk 
pooling, loss spreading is interpersonal in that those with above average 
accident costs spread the costs to those who have below average costs; 
similarly, those who incur accident costs early spread those costs to those 
who have accidents later.36 
Insurance can be pooled at varying degrees of complexity.  Different 
premiums exist for different levels of proneness to accidents, and 
individuals are invited to share risk only with those similarly situated in 
accident proneness.37  This flexibility in complexity allows insurance to 
effectively serve the needs of the pooling individuals. 
Finally, the third possible means of accident loss distribution is 
through enterprise liability.38  Under Judge Calabresi’s model, enterprise 
liability consists of two seemingly dissimilar systems of achieving 
 
 29  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 44-45. 
 30  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 44-45. 
 31  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 46. 
 32  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 46. 
 33  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 46. 
 34  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 47. 
 35  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 48. 
 36  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 48. 
 37  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 48. 
 38  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 50. 
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accident loss distribution.39  The first system places loss on those who are 
most likely to insure, or, if they choose not to insure, those who are able 
to bear the cost without secondary loss (i.e. those parties who are able to 
self-insure).40 
Enterprise liability also consists of a second system, which does not 
resemble the first system.  The second system of accident loss distribution 
involves placing losses on those who are in a position to pass part of the 
loss on to purchasers of their products as a “pass-through” cost.41  
Additionally, these parties may spread loss through manipulating the 
factors of production (i.e. labor and capital) that they employ.42 
Enterprise liability is more costly to administer than social insurance 
or private risk pooling.43  This indicates a desire not only to achieve loss 
spreading, but also to place a cost on the activities the party engages in.44  
It follows that we may see enterprise liability used as a system of accident 
loss spreading more often in product liability or strict liability cases than 
in negligence cases. 
iii. Reducing the Costs of Administering Accidents 
Judge Calabresi does not have much to say about reducing the costs 
of administering accidents.  However, Judge Calabresi considers it a 
“tertiary” sub-goal of accident law because its purpose is to reduce the 
costs of achieving primary and secondary cost reduction.45  Somewhat 
paradoxically, he also considers it to be of the utmost importance because 
efficiency “comes first.”46 
One of the ideal goals of accident law is to allocate the cost of 
accidents to the cheapest cost avoider—in other words, the entity for 
whom it is cheapest to undertake steps to avoid an accident.47  In Judge 
Calabresi’s estimation, however, the fault system allocates liability to 
individual parties, instead of groups most prone to similar accidents, with 
the result that accident costs are externalized to other groups.48  One 
certainty of administrative cost reduction is that a case-by-case jury 
determination is the most expensive aspect of fault reduction.49 
 
 39  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 50. 
 40  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 50. 
 41  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 51. 
 42  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 51. 
 43  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 54. 
 44  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 54. 
 45  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 28. 
 46  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 28. 
 47  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 250. 
 48  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 250. 
 49  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 251. 
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Surprisingly, Judge Calabresi is less concerned the potential 
shortcomings of the fault system than he is with “the failure to give 
weight to the fact that it costs different parties to an accident different 
costs to spread the accident costs, even though they may be equally prone 
to that particular accident.”50  Unfortunately, Judge Calabresi offers no 
real argument on how to practically reduce administrative costs.  In fact, 
as Judge Posner points out, Calabresi arrived at his conclusions on the 
fault system without conducting any inquiry in to the operation of the tort 
system.  Rather, Calabresi relied on a priori reasoning and semantics.51  
We can assume then, that there may be an adequate means of 
administrative cost reduction within the fault system that Judge Calabresi 
fails to grasp.  It may therefore be the case that the fault system does more 
than merely contribute to the externalization of costs.  The validity of 
these assertions will be explored below in the discussion of whether the 
current tort regime or suggested tort reforms achieve the goals and sub-
goals laid out by Judge Calabresi. 
III. WHAT IS TORT REFORM? 
A. Brief History of Tort Reform 
Over the last few decades, one of the hallmarks of American 
Conservatism has been unwavering support for the corrective powers of 
the free market.52  Conservatives have been quick to turn to the market as 
means to address all of society’s ills including poverty,53 racial 
discrimination,54 and education.55  In this narrative, the market 
maintained an ideal state of affairs, which was only upended when liberal 
politicians began to introduce the government into areas it did not 
belong.56  One of those areas was torts.57 
One of the great benefits of the market narrative is that it allowed 
tort law to seem apolitical.58  In reality, tort reform is anything but market 
driven.  Instead, it is driven by a coalition of large corporations, doctors, 
defense lawyers, insurance companies, tobacco and gun manufacturers, 
 
 50  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 252. 
 51  Posner, supra note 12, at 18. 
 52  JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO RILL BACK THE 
COMMON LAW 7-8 (2004). 
 53  See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-80 (1984).  
 54  See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS, 42-43 (3d ed. 1994).  
 55  See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 85-107 (1st ed. 1962).  
 56  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 8. 
 57  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 8. 
 58  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 9. 
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lobbyists and politicians.59  The aim of this alliance is to reduce the costs 
of accidents by removing protections for injured parties.60  In other words, 
tort reformers seek to lower their own costs by shifting costs to injured 
parties by making it more difficult to recover for injuries. 
The move towards tort reform began with calls to address a series of 
“crises.”61  The first “crisis” came in the 1970s due to large increases in 
medical malpractice premiums and product liability insurance 
premiums.62  In the 1980s another “crisis” struck, this time due to a 
general increase in liability insurance premiums.63  Finally, in the 1990s 
yet another batch of “crises” arose, caused by increases in product 
liability and medical malpractice insurance premiums.64 
Labeling rises in insurance premiums as “crises” allowed the 
proponents of tort reform to nationally coordinate their efforts.65  
Traditionally, tort law is a state-level matter and tort regimes may vary 
substantially from state to state.  Yet once the “crises” began to occur, 
conservative leaders at the federal level found themselves advocating for 
tort reform.  The 1994 Contract with America included references to tort 
reform as well.66 
As a result of the establishment of a coalition intended to achieve 
tort reform, combined with a political climate open to the message of 
insurance “crises,” tort reform has become institutionalized.67  Groups 
such as the American Tort Reform Association, various think tanks, and 
state-level reform organizations have helped develop arguments 
encouraging reform by persuading legislators and voters of the need for 
tort reform.  These organizations use their resources to lobby, support 
sympathetic political candidates, and even contribute to the election 
campaigns of local judges.68  Due to the influence of these organizations, 
their arguments are worth examining. 
B. Arguments for Tort Reform 
Tort reformers have embraced several different lines of argument in 
order to achieve their goals.  This Article addresses three of these 
 
 59  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 19. 
 60  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 19. 
 61  F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 469-70 (2006). 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. at 470. 
 64  Id. 470. 
 65  Id. 471. 
 66  Id. at 471. 
 67  Hubbard, supra note 61, at 471. 
 68  Hubbard, supra note 61, at 472. 
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arguments.  First, there has been an increase in litigation facilitated by 
greedy lawyers pushing frivolous lawsuits.  Second, juries award 
outrageous verdicts in favor of undeserving plaintiffs.  Third, the current 
tort regime is harmful to physicians who may be afraid to practice due to 
the high cost of malpractice insurance.  Each of these arguments fails to 
stand up to scrutiny. 
i. Increased Litigation and Greedy Lawyers 
There is a common belief that Americans are an exceptionally 
litigious group.69  Indeed, tort reformers suggest that Americans rarely 
miss an opportunity to take their grievances to court.70  Some have gone 
so far as to make the claim that as a society “we are diminished by 
reliance on the court system.”71  Tort litigator Joshua Kelner has gone as 
far as claiming that “we are culturally disempowered by the courts, as we 
are made less self-reliant, less willing to assume responsibility for our 
own actions, and less able to cooperate for the common good. In short, 
we are made weaker.”72  Despite the ostensibly strong nature of this 
rhetoric, it will become clear that it is hollowed when subjected to facts. 
The idea that we are a litigious society is complemented by the 
argument that there has been a significant increase in litigation recently.73  
Tort reformers would have us believe that this increased litigation is due 
in part to an increase in frivolous lawsuits.74  This argument, however, 
fails to consider the reality that the explosion of litigation is based on 
legitimate injuries suffered by innocent plaintiffs.  This would serve to 
undermine all of the arguments in favor of tort reform. 
Finally, tort reformers argue that the engines driving frivolous 
lawsuits and encouraging the litigiousness of our society are none other 
than greedy plaintiff attorneys.  Kelner argues that plaintiff attorneys 
“have both the skill and resources to capitalize upon an unsuspecting 
public and a permissive media in the advancement of their cause.”75  This 
argument is often supplemented by reference to the great wealth that 
many top trial lawyers have obtained in the course of their careers.76 
 
 69  Roland Christensen, Behind the Curtain of Tort Reform, 16 B.Y.U. L. REV. 261, 265 
(2016). 
 70  Id. 
 71  Joshua D. Kelner, The Anatomy of an Image: Unpacking the Case for Tort Reform, 31 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 296 (2006). 
 72  Id. 
 73  Christensen, supra note 69. 
 74  Christensen, supra note 69. 
 75  Kelner, supra note 71, at 250. 
 76  Christensen, supra note 69, at 270.  
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ii. Hot Coffee and the Undeserving Plaintiff 
A second argument in favor of tort reform centers on the frivolous 
lawsuits.  President Ronald Reagan used to speak of a lawsuit wherein a 
drunk driver struck a man inside a telephone booth.  Instead of suing the 
driver, the man turned around and sued the telephone company.77  
However, as is often the case, the politically expedient version of the case 
does not necessarily match the facts.  In reality, Mr. Charles Bigbee, the 
victim, and the telephone booth was located adjacent to a highway and 
near a driveway.  Further, the telephone booth had been placed on the 
same spot where a previous telephone booth had been destroyed in a 
similar incident less than two years earlier.  When Mr. Bigbee saw the 
driver coming he attempted to exit the booth, but the door had jammed.  
Mr. Bigbee settled with the driver, who may or may not have been drunk, 
and sued the telephone company.78  Once the facts are developed, 
President Reagan’s story seems to be an entirely different case from Mr. 
Bigbee’s experience. 
Perhaps the most popular example of an underserved plaintiff is the 
famous McDonald’s hot coffee case.  In that case a seventy-nine-year-old 
woman, Ms. Stella Liebeck, was riding as a passenger in her grandson’s 
vehicle, ordered a cup of McDonald’s hot coffee.79  Ms. Liebeck’s 
grandson stopped the vehicle so that Ms. Liebeck could put some cream 
in her coffee, which she had placed between her knees.  When Ms. 
Liebeck removed the lid from the Styrofoam cup, the entire cup of coffee 
spilled into her lap and was absorbed by her sweatpants, which resulted 
in third-degree burns over six percent of her body.80  Ms. Liebeck sued 
McDonald’s for $20,000 to cover her medical bills and expenses.  
However, the jury awarded an additional $2.7 million in punitive 
damages after it came to light that McDonald’s had received over 700 
complaints regarding the high temperature of their coffee products.81 
The Liebeck case is often held out as an example of an undeserving 
plaintiff; after all who doesn’t assume that hot coffee is hot?  Ms. Liebeck 
is thus considered to be the recipient of an outrageously high jury 
verdict.82  Tort reformers argue that plaintiffs like Ms. Liebeck are 
undeserving because their own irresponsibility lead to their injuries.  
Once again, the crux of the tort reformer’s argument is centered on a 
 
 77  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 23. 
 78  Bogus, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
 79  See Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., 1994 N.M. Dist. LEXIS 2. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. 
 82  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 24 (in reality, the judge reduced the punitive damages 
award back to $480,000 and it later settled for an undisclosed amount). 
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highly edited snapshot of a real case.  Once this snapshot is given context, 
it becomes an entirely different case from the one originally described.  
After all, a tort system that “rewards” plaintiffs seeking redress for 
injuries like those portrayed by tort reformers would justifiably seem 
broken.  The resultant “crises” would seem all the more real as well.  As 
such, the undeserving plaintiff argument is a powerful, albeit somewhat 
disingenuous, tool for tort reformers. 
iii. Harm to Physicians 
A third argument used in favor of tort reform is that the current tort 
regime is harmful to practicing physicians.  Physicians tend to be among 
the most vocal supporters of tort reform, claiming that high rates for 
malpractice insurance are a direct result of the tort system and doctors’ 
practice of defensive medicine in order to avoid lawsuits.83  If such 
allegations are provable, it would be a devastating argument in favor of 
reform.  However, even without proof, insurance companies have 
dangled the carrot of lower premiums in order to incentivize state 
legislatures to pass tort reform measures.84  The defensive medicine 
argument, while potentially sufficient to give pause to some, is wholly 
unsupported by empirical evidence. 
C. Common Methods of Tort Reform 
i. Damage Caps 
Instituting damage caps is a popular method used by states as a 
means of tort reform.  Using this method, states attempt to limit various 
types of awards including non-economic damages,85 punitive damages86 
and pain and suffering.87  These reforms are often the result of insurance 
companies testing a reduction in liability or malpractice insurance.88 
Damage caps often conflict with state constitutions because they 
violate the right of a party to a trial by jury,89 fail to grant equal protection 
 
 83  Julie Davies, Reforming the Tort Agenda, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 120, 152 (2007). 
 84  Stephanie Francis Ward, New Tactic in Tort Reform Battle: Insurer Promises Lower 
Rates if Legislature Caps Damages, 2 No. 23 A.B.A. J. E- REP. 4 (June 13, 2003). 
 85  See e.g. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN § 766.118 (West 2017). 
 86  See e.g. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (West 2017). 
 87  Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The Counter-
Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 687 (2008). 
 88  Christensen, supra note 69, at 271. 
 89  See Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 633 (Mo. 2012) 
(finding MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 is unconstitutional to the extent that it infringes on the 
jury role of determining the damages suffered by an injured party). 
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of the law,90 or violate some other constitutional protection.91 
ii. Changes in Liability Rules 
A second tactic for tort reformers is to move goal posts by changing 
liability rules.92  This includes “making liability less strict in products 
liability cases, setting up procedural obstacles in medical malpractice 
cases, and providing immunity from suit for certain industries.”93  The 
purpose of changing the rules is to lessen the likelihood of a suit ever 
being filed due to the barriers erected by reformers.94  Once a case has 
been filed, however, tort reformers seek to change the landscape to favor 
defendants.95 
The basic fault principle in most tort cases is negligence or causing 
harm to someone else by failing to act with the appropriate level of care.96  
Tort reformers have sought to move away from negligence by providing 
immunity from suit for entire groups of potential defendants.  Examples 
include the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,97 which would 
have had the effect of protecting both lawful and unlawful sales of 
firearms while prohibiting suit against gun manufacturers for injuries 
suffered due to the unlawful misuse of a gun.  Similar immunity was 
granted to suppliers of raw materials used in medical implants by the 
Biomaterials Access Assurance Act.98 
By changing the liability rules, tort reformers can shift the cost of 
the accident onto the injured by making it difficult or impossible to seek 
redress for injuries suffered.  It is questionable whether the immunity 
from liability of entire groups of manufacturers of dangerous products 
truly serves the purpose of tort law.  It does, however, serve the purpose 
of defendants. 
iii. Limiting Attorney Fees 
A third way tort reform seeks to lower the cost of torts is by limiting 
attorney fees, specifically by restructuring contingency fees.  This is a 
deliberate tactic to keep injured parties out of court by making it less 
profitable for lawyers to take cases.99  Furthermore, this tactic limits how 
 
 90  Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 894 (Fla. 2014). 
 91  See Best v. Taylor Mach Works, 689 N.E. 2d 1057, 1057 (Ill. 1997). 
 92  Christensen, supra note 69, at 271. 
 93  Roederer, supra note 87, at 686-87. 
 94  Roederer, supra note 87. 
 95  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 32. 
 96  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 32. 
 97  15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-03 (2005). 
 98  21 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (1998). 
 99  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 27. 
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aggressively claims are pursued, since aggressive representation is 
ultimately more costly.100 
This tactic intentionally has the effect of screening low-value 
cases.101  Filing fees, expert witnesses, travel expenses, administrative 
costs (including the costs of obtaining records, creating exhibits, ink, 
paper, etc.) all have to be paid upfront and come out of the lawyers 
pocket.102  These costs often add up to substantial amounts.103  Because 
law is a business, and like any other business, must remain profitable, 
lawyers are forced to weigh the potential cost of pursuing a case against 
the value of the case and the likelihood of recovery.  The result is that 
legitimate injuries with difficult facts or of seemingly low or negative 
value (that is, cases that would cost more to pursue than the case is worth 
to the lawyer) fall by the wayside. 
At the same time that tort reformers seem to be concerned about the 
danger to their clients from perfidious plaintiffs and their unscrupulous 
lawyers.  Professor Feinman points out that there appears to be little 
concern about the tactics employed or exorbitant fees charged by defense 
firms.104 
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST TORT REFORM 
A. Damage Caps as a Disincentive to Caution 
i. Regulation Through Litigation v. Regulation Through 
Legislation 
One way of viewing damages is as a form of regulation.  Regulation 
works by attaching a price to specific behaviors, making it more or less 
expensive to engage in the regulated behavior depending on the activity 
and social desirability.  The assumption is that people will only violate 
those regulations if the benefits outweigh the costs.105  In the tort system, 
regulation can be achieved by one of two methods: litigation or 
legislation. 
Regulation through legislation is the preferred method for tort 
reformers.  By using legislative tools to set the outer boundaries of tort 
 
 100  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 27. 
 101  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 28. 
 102  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 28. 
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 104  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 28. 
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awards, reformers would be effectively setting the price for every type of 
injury regardless of the acquired manner.106  In the tort reformers perfect 
world, tort liability would probably look similar to Game one, above.  The 
greater burden would fall on the injured party and industries producing 
dangerous products would often receive immunity from suit. 
This approach abandons any pretext that “the market” can cure any 
deficiencies in the tort system.  Even if tort reformers could claim that the 
market approach is effective, setting caps on damages would constitute 
market manipulation.  Trial lawyers, insurance companies, and other 
players in the tort system are aware of the recent jury verdicts being 
handed down for similar types of cases and they rely on those previous 
cases when it comes time to negotiate a settlement or bring a case to 
trial.107  Damage caps change the market by creating limits on the value 
of cases and taking away a critical function of the jury. 
It should not be claimed that all legislation is ineffective or 
disingenuous.  Some legislatures have enacted requirements that not only 
limit the number of cases which may be brought, but also ensure that 
cases which are filed have a good chance of succeeding.  For example, 
Illinois law requires that a medical malpractice complaint be 
accompanied by an affidavit declaring that the attorney has consulted 
with a physician who is knowledgeable in the relevant area of 
medicine.108 
On the other hand, regulation through litigation serves the market 
function by letting members of society—the people most likely to 
consume goods and services which cause injuries—decide on the price 
that injuring parties should pay those whom they have negligently 
injured.  The price may vary from plaintiff to plaintiff, but that is to the 
benefit of all because it verdicts become tailored to the facts of a case, 
rather than the criteria established by a heavily lobbied legislature.  
Finally, tort reformers would claim that regulation through litigation is 
the cause of unreasonably large jury verdicts.109  However, in the few 
cases cited as evidence of such inflated verdicts, most if not all of those 
cases resulted in either the trial court reducing the damages, an appeals 
court reducing the damages, or the parties settling for far less. 
 
 106  See e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (West 1986) (setting the aggregate dollar amount 
recoverable by all persons for injury or death due to malpractice at $600,000); IND. CODE. 
ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West 2011) (setting maximum recoverable amounts based upon the date 
of the injury). 
 107  Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1225, 1247-48 (2004). 
 108  735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (West 2004). 
 109  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 41. 
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ii. Moral Hazard 
Legislation-created damage caps put a ceiling on damages, limiting 
the recovery of injured persons.  As a result, if damage caps drop but 
insurance coverage stays the same, eventually a state of moral hazard 
could arise.  Insurance works as a means of eliminating risk.  For 
detrimental risks, the insured person pays a sum certain with the 
expectation that if the insured against risk ever does occur the insured 
person will be fully compensated.110 
Moral hazard is a negative behavior that occurs when a party is 
insured and therefore feels that they may participate in risky behavior in 
which they would not engage in if they were uninsured.  If states or, less 
likely, the federal government were to cap damages at a certain amount, 
it is likely that there would be a demand for insurance coverage up to that 
amount.  Not only would this eliminate any need for doctors to practice 
defensive medicine, but it would actually allow doctors to take potentially 
beneficial risks when treating clients, because the consequences for 
mistakes were less damaging, if at all. 
B. Existing Liability Rules Limit the Filing and Prosecution of 
Frivolous Law Suits 
i. Defining Effective Negligence Rules 
Since a rule of some type is obviously necessary, the next question 
is what that rule should be.  Ideally it should be simple and 
understandable to laypeople, yet broad enough to be applicable in a range 
of possible situations.  Put another way, there should be one simple 
standard for those who engage in activities that could potentially harm 
others. 
Let us return briefly to Game One.  Motor vehicle liability is 
founded upon a theory of negligence.  In our scenario the Driver owes a 
duty to operate his or her vehicle in the manner that a reasonable person 
under similar circumstances would.  That duty was breached, the 
Pedestrian was injured, and the breach was the proximate cause of the 
Pedestrian’s injuries.  The typical standard of care for general negligence 
is that of a reasonable person under similar circumstances.111  This is an 
adequate rule for a system of liability that seeks to perpetuate the policy 
that everyone is responsible for injuries caused to others due to a lack of 
ordinary care or skill in the management of property. 
Assume again the general parameters given in Game one.  A few 
 
 110  A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 56 (2d ed. 1989). 
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changes demonstrate the difference with a negligence rule including 
contributory negligence.  In this case the cells look similar except that in 
cell three the Pedestrian receives a payoff of -$10 and Driver receives a 
payoff of -$100. 
 
Game Two Payoffs: Pedestrian, Driver 
  Driver 
  No Care Due Care 
Pedestrian 
No Care -100, 0 -100, -10 
Due Care -10,-100 -20, -10 
 
The shift from forcing the Pedestrian to bear the cost to a negligence 
rule with contributory negligence achieves two things.  First it creates a 
dominant strategy for the Pedestrian, which is to always exercise due 
care.  Second, it incentivizes the Driver to also exercise due care as a 
means of reducing the potential cost of an accident to its lowest possible 
level.  In this way the negligence standard is able to satisfy the goal of 
reducing accident costs. 
But what about a rule involving comparative negligence?  In a 
comparative negligence system, the party who is the most careless bears 
the highest percentage of the accident cost.  Again, assume that an 
accident has a payoff of -$100 and is certain to happen unless both parties 
exercise due care (in which case there is a one in fifty chance of an 
accident occurring). 
Exercising due care has a payoff of -$10, while exercising some care 
has a payoff of -$5.  If one party exercises some care and the other does 
not, the one who fails to exercise some care has a payoff of -$99 while 
the party exercising some care has a payoff of -$1 plus the cost of 
exercising that care.  When one party exercises due care and the other 
exercises no care, the party exercising due care has a payoff of -$10 (the 
cost of exercising care) while the party exercising no care bears the full 
cost of the accident. 
 
Game 3 Payoffs: Pedestrian, Driver 
  Driver 
  No Care Some Care Due Care 
Pedestrian 
No Care -50, -50 -99, -6 -100, -10 
Some Care -6, -99 -55, -55 -105, -10 
Due Care -10, -100 -10, -105 -10, -10 
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Game Three offers a more complex range of choices for both the 
Driver and the Pedestrian, but once again, under a negligence rule, the 
optimal choice for both parties is to exercise due care.  As in Game Two, 
the practical value of a negligence rule lies in the fact that it incentivizes 
both parties to exercise due care.  Through these incentives, the goals 
observed by Judge Calabresi are satisfied and an effective rule is 
discerned.  Based on what is learned from Games One, Two, and Three, 
a negligence standard is not only a viable option, but an effective one as 
well. 
ii. Applying Negligence Rules to Tort Reform 
With the knowledge that currently existing negligence rules are 
capable of creating outcomes consistent with the goals of tort law, it is 
worth considering how often those laws are applied.  It has been 
estimated that only ten percent of Americans injured in accidents make a 
liability claim and only two percent file lawsuits.112  Professors Hyman 
and Silver have noted that the number of tort filings per 1,000 people 
peaked in 1990, while that amount decreased by 5 percent between 1993 
and 2002.113  Why such low numbers?  Professors Hyman and Silver 
provide six reasons why parties may choose not to sue.  First, many 
injured patients do not realize that they have been injured, or, if they do 
realize that they have been injured, the statute of limitations has passed.114  
Second, a number of injuries caused by malpractice are not serious 
enough to warrant a suit.115  Third, treatments required to overcome 
malpractice injuries are covered by victims own insurance.116  Fourth, the 
cost of suit is too high, whether monetarily, emotionally or both.117  Fifth, 
medical malpractice claims often have poor outcomes, which fail to cover 
their expenses.118  Finally, injured parties may use cheaper or faster 
alternative methods to resolve claims.119 
Given these low numbers, the supposed explosion in litigation as 
portrayed by tort reformers seems dubious.  In fact, Professor Herbert 
Kritzer conducted a study on the screening processes used by plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in Wisconsin and uncovered some interesting facts.  In 
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Professor Kritzer’s survey, respondents reported 53,584 contacts 
requesting legal representation; surprisingly nearly 70 percent of those 
requests were declined.120  Furthermore, 80 percent or more of the 
malpractice cases were rejected. 
These numbers suggest frivolous lawsuits are not flooding the 
courts.  If anything, these numbers demonstrate that those who have 
suffered injuries may be underutilizing the tort system.  The ability of 
lawyers to selectively choose the cases they accept, as well as the fact the 
common law negligence rules that discourage filing non-meritorious 
suits, results in very few potential tort cases actually being filed. 
C. Limiting Attorney’s Fees Would Result in Less Access to Justice 
Reducing attorney’s fees in legal actions is often suggested as a third 
type of tort reform.  The most frequent payment arrangement used by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys is the contingency fee.  Under this system the 
attorney’s fee is a percentage of the recovery if the case is successful.121  
Ideally, this system allows people of modest or limited means to pursue 
a claim that they may not otherwise be able to pursue if required to 
provide payment up front.122  Because the plaintiffs’ attorney only gets 
paid if there is a recovery, there is an incentive to decline cases that are 
weak or unlikely to result in a substantial recovery.123  Many states 
already limit the amount an attorney may recover in a given action.124  
Perhaps unsurprising, these reforms uniformly fail to limit the amount 
defense firms may earn while representing clients in tort actions.  The 
effect of this is two-fold.  First, it incentivizes lawyers to screen out viable 
cases where there is a low likelihood of recovery or where the recovery 
amount is minimal.  In the process, individuals who have suffered 
legitimate injuries are denied representation.125  Second, it incentivizes 
well-financed defendants to attempt to make litigation too costly for the 
plaintiff to take the case all the way through an extensive trial. 
In general, plaintiffs face difficult odds once a case proceeds to trial 
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because only 52 percent of cases result in a favorable verdict.126  Thus, 
nearly half of all cases result in no payment for the attorney representing 
the injured parties.  In medical malpractice cases, juries return a verdict 
for the defense in 73 to 81 percent of cases.127  These statistics alone 
demonstrate that an explosion of frivolous lawsuits is implausible.  
However, the tort reform responses have a legitimate tendency to keep 
injured parties out of court and thus denying injured parties just 
compensation. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Tort Reform Fails to Achieve Either of the Main Goals of 
Accident Law 
i. Tort Reform Fails to Dispense Justice 
“Justice” is an abstract term open to interpretation based on an 
individual’s personal views and preferences.  Defining “justice” can be 
difficult, so it is often easier to describe examples of injustice rather than 
examples of justice.128  However, analysis of the commonly proposed 
methods of tort reform necessitates a definition of justice.  For the 
purposes of this Article, justice is defined as the fair compensation of 
accident victims by those liable to them for causing their injuries.  Even 
this definition is flawed (for example, what is “fair compensation?”), yet 
it is sufficient for analyzing proposed tort reforms. 
Using this definition, the most common types of tort reform fail to 
meet the goal of delivering justice to individuals whose injuries are 
caused by others.  Caps on damages mean that some injuries or losses 
may lack adequate compensation, with the injured party being forced to 
absorb some of the cost of the accident, while the tortfeasor escapes 
paying some costs for which the tortfeasor has been found liable.129  As 
part of a common theme, tort reform seeks to shift the cost of accidents 
away from injuring parties and onto those who have been injured by the 
negligence of others. 
Attempting to change the rules of liability also fails to achieve the 
goal of distributing justice.  No one likes a level playing field; plaintiffs 
prefer a legal system that favors them, and defendants and insurance 
companies favor a legal system that favors high burdens of proof and 
limited damages awards.  When the legal system for negligence is similar 
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or identical to the system discussed above in Game Three Payoffs: 
Pedestrian, Driver,130 parties are forced to bear the costs of their own 
actions and the landscape is not tilted in favor of either party. 
As discussed previously, tort reform seeks to avoid this level playing 
field by moving the goal posts.131  Often this means attempting to exempt 
entire industries from liability for injuries either caused by their products 
or by their actions.132  This is yet another cost shifting mechanism that 
intends to relieve the cost burden of accident costs on defendants by 
making it more difficult or impossible to hold them accountable. 
Finally, and perhaps most troubling, is that an attempt to limit legal 
fees not only fails to address the administration of justice, but it actively 
seeks to deny justice to injured parties by keeping them out of the 
courts.133  Often couched in commercially appealing terms of limiting 
awards to greedy plaintiffs and unscrupulous attorneys, the reality is that 
lawyers who cannot afford to take cases from which they are unlikely to 
profit often screen out lower value cases.134  Of course insurance 
companies, defense counsel, defendants, other repeat players, and the 
politicians for whom they lobby to pass reform, are all aware of these 
facts, however, denying access to justice has been their goal from the 
beginning. 
ii. Tort Reform Fails to Reduce Accident Costs 
The second major goal of accident law is the reduction of accident 
costs.135  This includes not just the cost of accidents per se, but also the 
cost of avoiding accidents.136  Reducing accident costs is a very broad 
goal, which could be achieved in a variety of ways, yet tort reformers 
have consistently shown that reducing accident costs as a whole is not 
their intent.  Rather, they seek to reduce accident costs to their clients, 
insureds, and political donors. 
As discussed above, and indeed throughout this essay, the common 
methods of tort reform do not reduce accident costs.  Instead, they shift 
accident costs from those liable for causing harm to the injured parties 
themselves.  This is neither just, nor is it a reduction of costs.  Further, it 
pushes the accident law system closer to the system we see in Game One, 
in which neither party has any incentive to exercise any degree of care. 
 
 130  Supra Section IV(B)(i). 
 131  Christensen, supra note 69, at 271. 
 132  Roederer, supra note 87, at 686-87. 
 133  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 27. 
 134  FEINMAN, supra note 52, at 28.  
 135  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 26. 
 136  CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 26. 
TRACZ 2018 
2018] HALF TRUTHS, EMPTY PROMISES, AND HOT COFFEE 333 
Needless to say, an accident system in which negligence cases are 
treated in the manner described in Game One does not benefit society.  
Instead, it benefits a few corporations, insurance companies, their 
investors, defense attorneys (whose legal fees would remain uncapped), 
lobbyists, and politicians.  Incidentally, it increases certain social costs, 
increasing those who receive disability because they cannot pay their 
medical bills, bankruptcy, and other added costs, which could be avoided 
by the liable party being held accountable. 
Furthermore, reducing the cost of accidents can be divided into three 
sub-goals: (1) attempting to reduce the frequency or severity of accidents; 
(2) reducing societal costs of accidents; and (3) reducing administrative 
costs of accidents.137  Each sub-goal is discussed in greater detail below.  
However, the outcome ultimately remains the same and the common 
methods of tort reform fail to reduce the cost of accidents. 
B. Tort Reform Fails to Achieve the Sub-goals of Accident Law 
i. Tort Reform Does Not Attempt to Reduce the Frequency or 
Severity of Accidents 
One of the most important ways in which accident law reduces the 
costs of accidents is by acting as a deterrent.  When the cost of negligently 
engaging in an activity is clear, a potential actor will weigh the costs of 
the negligent act and determine whether it is more than he or she is willing 
to bear.  If the cost is too high, the potential actor will refrain from 
negligently engaging in that activity.  However, if the cost is too low to 
discourage the negligent behavior, then there will be no incentive to 
refrain from behaving negligently. 
Damage caps do not incentivize careful behavior because they limit 
the potential cost of negligence.  Furthermore, damage caps coupled with 
insurance may serve to create a scenario of moral hazard in which the 
incentive to act carefully dissipates to the point of near nonexistence.  
This in turn brings us back to the situation faced in Game One, where the 
combination of damage caps and insurance makes the potential accident 
cost so low that regardless of the injured parties own level of care, the 
injured party will likely still end up carrying the burden of the costs of 
their own injuries. 
It would be disingenuous to say that there has been any attempt by 
tort reformers to use damage caps to reduce the frequency and severity of 
accidents—unless the argument is that incentivizing consumers not to 
consume, pedestrians not to walk, and patients not to visit the doctor 
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somehow achieves both of these goals.  This is an absurdity given that 
the economy cannot function without consumers, consumers cannot 
consume without some sort of protection, not everyone can afford a 
vehicle, and medical care is essential to good health.  What is really 
happening is not cost reduction; it is cost shifting. 
Similarly, changing the rules of liability by exempting certain 
industries does not reduce the cost of accidents.  One of the great traits of 
the common law is that it allows us to create new and efficient rules in 
order to allocate liability in accidents.  This is seen in Game Three, where 
the party who bears the most responsibility for the injury bears the most 
cost.  Using the legislative process to change these rules takes time 
(including drafting, debating and signing into law) and may not be 
effective at actually reducing accident costs.  The existing common law 
rules, however, are effective at allocating liability for accident costs. 
ii. Tort Reform Fails to Address Societal Costs of Accidents 
Tort reform fails to reduce the allocative costs of accident as well as 
their distributive and/or societal costs.  Three primary means through 
which accident loss distribution can occur were discussed above: (1) 
social insurance; (2) private risk pooling; and (3) enterprise liability.138 
One of the great promises of tort reform is that it will lower the cost 
of insurance premiums.139  For example, insurance companies advertise 
reduced premiums and in return legislators make it more difficult to sue 
insurance companies.  However, this is often not the case even when tort 
reform occurs.  Instead, insurance premiums stay the same and we can 
only assume that the only change is an increase in the dividends received 
by those who have invested in the insurance companies. 
But that is not all; indeed tort reformers claim that high insurance 
premiums deter some doctors from practicing anything other than 
defensive medicine.140  However, empirical evidence debunks this 
story.141  Towers Watson142 found that between 2006 and 2011, medical 
malpractice direct total premiums had decreased every year despite 
increases in tort litigation costs.143  This indicates that insurance 
premiums do not respond to tort reform as promised by reformers. 
 
 138  Supra Section II(B)(ii). 
 139  Stephanie Francis Ward, New Tactic in Tort Reform Battle: Insurer Promises Lower 
Rates if Legislature Caps Damages, 2 No. 23 A.B.A. J. E- REP. 4 (June 13, 2003). 
 140  Christensen, supra note 69, at 268. 
 141  ROSS EISENBERRY, TORT COSTS AND THE ECONOMY, MYTHS, EXAGGERATIONS, AND 
PROPAGANDA 6-7 (2006), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-/old/briefingpapers/174/bp174.pdf. 
 142  Id. at 6 (Formerly Towers Perrin and suspected by the Economic Policy Institute of 
inflating tort cost numbers). 
 143  TOWERS WATSON, 2011 UPDATE ON U.S. TORT COST TRENDS 4 (2012). 
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While social insurance would be easy to implement, the very nature 
of creating a tax for the purpose of accident loss distribution in which all 
taxpayers share the cost of accidents would be politically unpalatable to 
many conservative lawmakers, even if it might be cheaper in the long run 
for potential clients.  Similarly, enterprise liability would be a form of 
accident loss distribution that would run counter to tort reformers efforts 
to exclude certain groups from liability for accidents involving their 
products.  If tort reform fails to reduce the cost of private risk pooling, 
and social insurance and enterprise liability are unpalatable, then tort 
reform has not succeeded in reducing the distributive costs of accidents. 
iii. Tort Reform Affects Administrative Costs But Only at the 
Expense of Justice 
Finally, tort reform does have some discernable effect on the 
administrative costs, but it is for the wrong reasons.  As discussed above, 
tort reform has little to do with justice or cost reduction, instead it trends 
more toward cost shifting.  Yet it also seeks to keep injured parties out of 
court.  This should be viewed not as a success for tort reform, but as an 
alarming signal of political willingness to allow people to suffer injuries 
without compensation in order to protect corporate donors. 
Potential plaintiffs are kept out of court by attempts to change the 
liability rules, damage caps, and limits on attorney fees.  All of these 
methods make it either impossible to file a lawsuit, or not profitable for 
an attorney to pursue justice on behalf of an injured client.  While this 
does result in a reduction of administration costs, it does not increase 
efficiency.  The reductions are enabled by reduced access to the justice 
system, which is never an acceptable trade-off. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Tort reform is not inherently flawed.  Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes once wrote, “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been 
experience.”144  When experience tells us a legal rule or doctrine is not 
working, it is time to replace that rule or doctrine.  However, tort reform 
as a political agenda meant to improve the lot of certain repeat players, 
rather than for the benefit of society as a whole, is not preferable. 
The goals accident law should aspire to achieve are reducing the 
frequency, severity, and cost of accidents.  Unfortunately, the most 
common types of tort reform do not achieve these goals.  Rather than 
reduce the cost of accidents, tort reformers instead seek to shift the cost 
of accidents to injured parties by either limiting their recovery or making 
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it difficult for them to bring their case in court.  For these reasons modern 
tort reform is ineffective and detrimental to society. 
 
